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Abstract 
 Infants can perceive categorical differences in speech sounds based on the distribution of 
features in a set of sounds they are briefly exposed to (Maye et al, 2001). The present work 
proposes a mechanism for this category learning and implements it in a dynamic field model, 
reproducing the effect in which bimodally distributed features led to category discrimination and 
unimodally distributed features led to non-discrimination. The categorical effect is therefore 
explainable as an emergent property of the dynamics of a domain-general perceptual-cognitive 
learning system. Then, an experiment was designed to investigate whether the same mechanism 
could be used domain-generally to categorize actions. 10.5-12-month infants viewed a set of 
animated actions that differed in a feature that had either a unimodal or bimodal distribution. 
Looking time and rate of looking away were measured to determine whether the distributional 
information in the input modulated attention and whether infants learned to perceive the actions 
categorically. 
 
 
Introduction 
How do infants identify actions occurring around them? Infants are constantly confronted 
with a multitude of people and objects moving and interacting in various ways, seemingly 
without obvious cues to when actions begin and end, or which actions fall into the same 
category. For example, when an adult reaches for a toy and gives it to the infant, what portion of 
the action corresponds to reaching and what portion to giving? When Mom’s arm extends toward 
the toy, is she reaching for it or pointing to it? Identifying such actions is a crucial prerequisite 
for tasks such as verb learning and understanding of others’ goals. Current theories often take a 
top-down approach in which knowledge that others are intentional agents drives the development 
of action perception. However, these accounts undervalue the role of basic perceptual and 
statistical learning mechanisms. The current research investigates whether a statistical learning 
mechanism infants use to categorize speech sounds can be extended to categorizing actions.  
Infants have powerful mechanisms for extracting structure from continuous perceptual 
input, and many of these mechanisms have been investigated in detail in the domain of language 
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acquisition. Human language, especially the speech people use around infants, has well-
documented predictable structure on multiple levels [1, 2]. Moreover, infants are sensitive to 
many of these regularities [3]. In recent decades, extensive research demonstrated that 
prelinguistic infants use multiple mechanisms to learn regularities in structured linguistic input 
[4]. These statistical learning mechanisms have been shown to be domain-general by replicating 
language-learning experiments using visual stimuli or nonlinguistic sounds such as tones or 
animal sounds [5]. This suggests that infant statistical learning is not merely an adaptation for 
language acquisition, but rather may be involved in learning meaningful regularities from 
structured experience in several domains, including the perception of action. 
Concurrently with segmenting an action sequence into its components, infants must 
categorize the resulting segments before they can be useful for verb learning or understanding 
others’ intentions. They must, for instance, reliably distinguish a reach from a point in order to 
map these actions onto words or predict whether someone intends to grab an object or to 
communicate. Categorization of actions has been studied with a framework grounded in the 
semantics of motion verbs in language. Although the characteristics of a motion can be described 
in several ways, natural languages have a strong tendency to encode them in verbs according to 
path and/or manner. For example, English verbs encode a distinction in manner between walk 
and run in “The cow walked/ran into the barn,” and a distinction in path between enter and leave 
in “The cow entered/left the barn.” After exposure to a set of actions with one of manner or path 
constant and the other variable, infants under a year can discriminate a novel action that 
preserves the invariant feature from one that is novel in both features [6].  
In an alternative, perceptually grounded framework inspired by research on face 
processing, infants use “featural” and “configural” information to categorize actions [7]. Featural 
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information consists of local details (e.g., scratching vs brushing the shoulder), while configural 
information consists of more global properties (e.g., a straight vs arcing path toward an object). 
Infants more easily distinguished between actions with featural changes, even when configural 
changes were much greater in magnitude.  
What accounts for biases for local detail in categorizing actions? Infants could have an 
evolved bias to attend to featural information, which would be adaptive because such 
information is more useful for mapping actions to words and deciphering other people’s 
intentions. Alternatively, infants could learn to attend selectively to certain aspects of actions 
based on prior experience, as in perceptual narrowing, in which young infants initially 
discriminate between a wide variety of different stimuli, then gradually lose the ability to 
discriminate between stimuli with which they have less experience. Perceptual narrowing occurs 
most rapidly during the second half of the first year, when infants lose the ability to distinguish 
between stimuli, such as monkey faces or phonemes from other languages, that are not relevant 
to their developmental context [8]. As infants lose the ability to discriminate some stimuli, they 
also begin to perceive discrete categories, discarding within-category variation as irrelevant. 
Thus, perceptual experience guides infants to the most useful sources of information. 
Previous work, however, has left unspecified the nature of infants’ representations for 
actions. Do infants have conceptual knowledge about actions, or do they perceive actions using 
lower-level features? In order to investigate this issue, the current study introduces actions that 
vary systematically along a perceptual variable.  
Distributional Learning 
Maye et al. [9] demonstrated a particular unsupervised statistical-learning mechanism 
that can account for perceptual narrowing of phonemic contrasts. Infants heard stimuli along a 
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continuum between two phonemes, [d] and [t], which varied along two parameters, voice onset 
time and formant structure. One group heard a set of sounds with the features in a unimodal 
distribution, while the other group heard them in a bimodal distribution, indicating the presence 
of a category distinction (Fig.1). Only the bimodal group subsequently distinguished between 
stimuli from opposite sides of the continuum. Thus, when the distribution of inputs along a 
particular dimension reflects a relevant distinction, infants learn to attend selectively to that 
dimension. In addition, a recent study showed that the same type of learning can account for both 
loss of sensitivity to features that occur in a unimodal distribution and gain of sensitivity to 
features that occur in a bimodal distribution [10]. If this learning mechanism generalizes to the 
domain of action perception, then quantitative features of actions that occur in bimodal 
distributions should result in behavior consistent with categorization, while unimodal 
distributions should not. This can potentially account for the finding of increased sensitivity to 
featural information; local details may be more salient because they tend to fall in roughly 
discrete categories, while global properties may tend to be more uniformly distributed.  
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Figure 1: Reproduced from Maye et al. 2002. Bimodal vs. Unimodal distributions of stimuli used 
for familiarization. The distribution for the Bimodal group is shown by the dashed line, and the 
Unimodal group by the solid line. 
Categorization 
Although categorization in infants has been extensively studied, research on the 
mechanisms of category formation has been scarce [11]. One approach has used autoencoder 
networks to simulate categorization. These networks work by receiving the input in one layer 
and reconstructing it in an output layer, after passing through a hidden layer, which crucially has 
fewer units than the input layer. The hidden layer therefore cannot represent the input with full 
detail, but learns to encode a more compact representation. Mareschal and French [12] simulated 
data from Younger’s 1985 study [13], in which infants saw a set of line drawings of animals, 
whose features (leg length, ear separation, etc.) were correlated in one group, indicating a 
category distinction, and uncorrelated in another, indicating the lack of a distinction. The 
network reproduced infant looking-time data and the internal representation in the hidden layer 
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showed category-like behavior: when features were correlated, the internal representation formed 
two clusters when activation in the three hidden units was plotted on three axes, while in the 
uncorrelated condition the representations were scattered throughout the representation space. 
What is described on the surface as “categorization” may be conceptualized as a distortion of the 
space in which items are represented, such that the distance between within-category items 
decreases and that among categories increases. This account is supported by evidence that, in 
adults, experience with categorically structured visual stimuli results in better discrimination 
between categories than within a category [14]. A similar distortion-based model comes 
naturally out of dynamic field models, discussed below. 
Dynamic Field Theory 
Dynamic field theory (DFT) is a framework for modeling neural computation that 
incorporates principles of cortical networks [15, 16]. The architecture involves layered fields of 
activation laid out along continuous spatial or feature dimensions. Input from the environment 
drives activation in a subset of these layers, while the intrinsic dynamics of the fields cause 
activation to evolve over time. Locally excitatory connections within a layer and laterally 
inhibitory interactions between layers allow activation to become self-sustaining, and persist in 
the absence of input. Layers with slower timescales of activation and decay provide memory that 
allows the system to store representations of previously encountered input. Excitatory and 
inhibitory connections between layers allow memory storage, influences of memory on 
processing, and other computations. Variations of this structure have been used to simulate many 
empirical findings, including but not limited to visually guided reaching, spatial cognition, 
habituation, and categorization [17, 18, 19]. Simulating distributional learning with a domain-
general model links the proposed learning mechanism with cognitive dynamics more broadly. 
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Johnson, Spencer and Schöner [20] used DFT to simulate biases in spatial recall as well as recall 
in a nonspatial dimension, color. After experience with certain colors, the model accumulated a 
long-term memory trace for those colors. Then, while holding a color in short-term memory, the 
short- and long-term representations interact such that the remembered color shifts, as observed 
in behavioral studies. A similar mechanism underlies the simulation we present here, but we use 
a much more varied input set to lay the long-term memory trace, and we interpret directional 
biases induced by the shifting of internal representations as a global distortion of the 
representation space in a way that produces categorical behavior.  
Habituation 
The current study involves familiarizing infants with a corpus of animated actions. 
During exposure, infants are acquiring representations of these actions. Habituation occurs when 
repeated exposures to the same stimulus result in diminishing response [21], and dishabituation 
refers to the recovery in response that occurs to a new stimulus if it is successfully discriminated 
from the old one. As infants habituate to the display, therefore, the pattern of looking times to 
each animation can provide information about the representations they are forming. Infants are 
active information gatherers, and the control of visual attention is correspondingly complex and 
incompletely understood. Therefore, a secondary goal of the current study is to investigate 
attention to the stimulus as a function of both time and the distribution of previously seen 
stimuli. Infants allocate less attention to stimuli that are too simple (e.g. already understood or 
uninteresting) or too complex (e.g. unlearnable or random) [22, 23]. Although the precise 
mechanism of this effect likely differs among contexts and modalities, a unifying principle is that 
attention and the formation of representations (i.e. learning) interact bidirectionally and 
dynamically. Such “smart” allocation of attention derives at least in part from habituation. 
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However, while habituation-based paradigms are used extensively in developmental psychology, 
there are few studies investigating the dynamics of interactions between attention and learning. 
Here I present a DFT model that replicates distributional learning of categories as in 
Maye et al. Then, we exposed 10.5-12-month infants to a set of animated actions that differed 
along a quantitative, linear dimension. Half of infants observed a unimodal distribution and the 
other half observed a bimodal distribution. We recorded their looking times and frequency of 
looks away from the stimulus during familiarization, and during a test phase we asked whether 
their looking behavior was sensitive to changes in the stimulus. We hypothesized that infants 
would look more overall to the bimodal distribution during familiarization because it contained 
more learnable structure, which would engage their attention. Further, we hypothesized that 
infants in the Bimodal condition would discriminate cross-category changes in motion in the test 
phase, while infants in the Unimodal condition would not. 
Study 1: Simulation 
We used a DFT model was used with 4 fields (Fig. 2).  to simulate distributional learning 
of speech-sound categories. Previously, McMurray et al [24] modeled distributional category 
learning as optimization of a mixture of Gaussians to fit the observed distribution. Such a model 
can account for distributional category learning, but is specific to this task and does not address 
its implementation in a distributed, dynamic system. 
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Figure 2: Schematic of model. Each field (Perceptual field PF, Inhibitory field IF, 
Working memory WM, Long-term memory store of working memory LTM-WM) consists of a 
one-dimensional array of 181 neurons, with connections within and between fields as shown and 
described in the text. Input was in the form of activity added directly to neurons in PF.  
The model contains four fields, each of which consists of an array of 181 neurons. Each 
neuron is mapped to a point in the one-dimensional continuum of speech sounds, so that neurons 
closer to 1 represent sounds closer to [da] and neurons closer to 181 represent sounds closer to 
[ta]. Each neuron computes its continuous activity level at each time step. The change in activity 
of a neuron at each time step is the sum of terms representing decay towards a resting (inactive) 
level, input from other neurons and/or stimuli, and random noise (See Appendix for equations). 
If a neuron outputs to another neuron, the other neuron receives input according to a sigmoid 
function of the first neuron’s activity level. 
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Neurons in the perceptual field (PF) receive direct input from the stimulus. They also 
receive excitatory connections from other PF neurons and from neurons in the working memory 
field (WM), and receive inhibitory connections from neurons in the inhibitory field (IF). The 
strength of connection between two neurons is a Gaussian function of the distance between them 
in the one-dimensional array, so that local connections are stronger than distant connections; the 
variance and maximum height of this function is different for each pair of connected fields. 
Neurons in WM receive excitatory connections from other WM neurons and from neurons in PF, 
and receive inhibitory connections from neurons in IF. Neurons in IF receive excitatory 
connections from neurons in PF and from neurons in WM.  
 The variance of inhibitory connections is greater than that of excitatory connections, thus 
adjacent neurons within PF and WM are excitatory while more distant neurons, though they have 
weak excitatory connections, are overall inhibitory (mediated by IF). This results in the 
formation of stable peaks of activity: when a neuron becomes active, reciprocal excitatory 
connections with nearby neurons result in stable high activity in a few nearby neurons, which 
does not spread to the rest of the field. The weights are set so that an activity peak in PF leads to 
the formation of an activity peak in WM; once a peak forms in WM, inhibition is strong enough 
to abolish a peak in PF if it is in the same location. Thus, activity in PF is transient, while activity 
in WM can be sustained over time, allowing it to function as working memory. 
 To allow for long-term learning effects, WM is associated with a long-term memory layer 
(LTM-WM). LTM-WM has slow dynamics; its time constants of rise and decay in activity are 
much slower than the other fields, so activity persists over the course of the whole simulation. 
Whenever activity in WM is above a threshold, LTM-WM receives input in the corresponding 
location. Thus, it remembers what locations have been active in WM in the past. Later, when 
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activity peaks form in WM, they are facilitated by the presence of activity in LTM-WM at the 
corresponding locations. Further, if activity in LTM-WM is stronger on one side of the WM peak 
than the other, then the asymmetric input causes the WM peak to drift in the direction of higher 
LTM-WM activation. This introduces a history-dependent bias that can account for distributional 
learning.  
 The model was used to simulate the distributional learning study in Maye et al. (2002). In 
that experiment, the stimuli were synthesized speech sounds that differed along a one-
dimensional continuum defined by voice onset time and formant structure, varying between [da] 
and [ta]. In the simulation, we assume the perceptual system extracts these features and model 
the input as activation directly passed to the perceptual field. Stimuli were represented as 
Gaussian inputs to the perceptual field, with constant variance and mean varying in proportion to 
the acoustic features. The model was given 64 familiarization trials, each of which contained one 
input stimulus, taken in random order from the distributions in Fig.1. 
At the start of each trial, the perceptual field, inhibitory field, and working memory field 
were set to resting values, while the long-term memory field accumulated a memory trace across 
trials.  After the start of the trial, stimulus was introduced and the activity in each field was 
allowed to evolve. 
After the 64 familiarization trials, the “test” trial consisted of either two identical 
presentations of stimulus 3, or a presentation of stimulus 3 followed by a presentation of stimulus 
6.. If the network learned to distinguish the two stimuli, these two test trials should induce a 
different pattern of activity; if it learned to ignore the difference, they should produce the same 
pattern of activity. In the model, a “same” response occurs when the perceptual field has no 
activation, because its activation is inhibited by the corresponding location being active in 
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working memory. A “different” response occurs when the perceptual field is activated, because 
any positions held in working memory are not close enough to inhibit the region where input 
occurs. 
Because the distributions in Fig. 1 were chosen to equalize the range and the frequency of 
the test items, they could not be controlled for variance. The bimodal distribution had a greater 
variance than the unimodal distribution. Therefore, to control for the possibility that greater 
variance, rather than bimodality, in the input distribution drives discrimination, a Variance-
Control condition was included in which the input distribution was identical to the unimodal 
distribution in shape, but stretched by a factor of 1.323 so that its variance was equal to that of 
the bimodal distribution.  
Results 
The LTM-WM field was able to represent a good approximation of the input distribution. 
The unimodal or bimodal activation in this field by the end of the familiarization period reflects 
the most frequently activated locations in WM over the course of many stimulus presentations 
(Fig. 3). 
	   14	  
A	  
B	  
	   15	  
 
 
Figure 3: LTM-WM field builds up a representation of the input distribution over time. 
Representative time course of activity in LTM-WM, A: unimodal condition. B: bimodal 
condition. C: Mean (± SD) activity distribution in LTM-WM at the end of familiarization, data 
from 20 runs of simulation. Solid line: unimodal condition, Dashed line: bimodal condition 
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In Same test trials, the identical input was presented twice (Fig. 4.1). The remembered 
distributions (Fig. 4.5) cause the internal representation in WM and IF to drift towards the peaks 
(Fig. 4.3, 4.4) but in both cases the activity in IF still overlaps the input location, so the PF is 
inhibited and a second peak of activity is not formed at the second stimulus presentation (Fig. 
4.2). Thus, in both conditions the model gives a Same response. 
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Figure 4: Activity during Same test trials, with position in the field on the horizontal axis and 
time on the vertical axis. Left: Unimodal condition Right: Bimodal condition. (1) Stimulus, (2) 
PF, (3) IF, (4) WM, (5) LTM-WM                 
 
In Different test trials, the two test inputs were on opposite sides of the overall mean (Fig. 
5.1). The remembered distributions (Fig. 5.5) cause the internal representation in WM and IF to 
drift towards the peaks (Fig. 5.3, 5.4). In the unimodal condition, the drift is toward the single 
peak in the center, increasing the overlap with the location of the second stimulus, so the PF is 
inhibited and a second peak of activity is not formed at the second stimulus presentation (Fig. 
5.2a). In contrast, in the bimodal condition the drift is away from the center towards one of the 
remembered peaks, decreasing the overlap with the location of the second stimulus. Therefore 
the PF is not inhibited, and a second peak of activity forms at the new stimulus presentation (Fig. 
5.2b). Thus, the Bimodal condition gives a Different response while the unimodal condition 
gives a Same response. The Variance-Control condition produced the same pattern as the 
Unimodal condition, suggesting that the bimodal versus unimodal shape of the distributions, not 
variance, drives the differences in discrimination (Fig. 6), though this needs to be tested in 
infants.    
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 Figure 5: Activity during Different test trials, with position in feature space on the 
horizontal axis and time on the vertical axis. Left: Unimodal condition Right: Bimodal condition 
1) Stimulus 2) PF 3) IF 4) WM 5) LTM-WM       
	   21	    
1	  
2	  
3	  
4	  
5	  
Variance-­‐Control	  condition	  
	   22	  
 Figure 6: Increased variance without bimodality did not result in discrimination. Plots 
show activity during Different test trials in the Variance-Control condition. 1) Stimulus 2) PF 3) 
IF 4) WM 5) LTM-WM 
                 
Discussion 
The DFT model reproduces the distributional categorization effect. Rather than forming 
explicit, discrete categories, the drifting of internal representations occurs so that they tend to 
gravitate toward regions of the perceptual space with more experience (i.e. stronger LTM 
activity). This has the effect of bringing representations closer to the most typical member of the 
category, which increases perceived similarity within a category and decreases perceived 
similarity between categories. Limitations of the model include that here, as in laboratory 
experiments, the experience is presented all in one continuous block. In the actual environment 
of developing organisms, while rich distributional experience is available, it is interspersed with 
many other experiences over a long period. Thus, for this mechanism to operate over 
developmental time in infants, there must be a way to maintain multiple partially learned 
distributions simultaneously. 
Another limitation is the nature of the model’s output. Because the behavioral data from 
infants consist of looking times that were either the same or significantly different across 
conditions, the presence or absence of a peak is a sufficient output to evaluate the fit with 
empirical data. However, it would be useful to predict quantitatively the degree to which within-
category stimuli are perceived as more similar and between-category stimuli are perceived as 
more different. This could be reflected in the model as a function of the size or duration of peaks 
rather than their mere presence, and could be measured.  
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The model architecture has been applied in nonlinguistic cognitive tasks such as spatial 
recall, spatial discrimination and reaching [17, 18, 19]. Because distributional learning can be 
captured using general cognitive mechanisms, it should not be specific to categorization of 
speech sounds. We therefore hypothesized that the same mechanism could be used to categorize 
dynamic actions. Provided that the dynamic visual environment provides similar distributional 
regularities to the static objects and speech sounds infants encounter, they should be learnable by 
similar mechanisms. However, although distributional learning of speech and static visual 
displays has been observed [9, 10, 14], dynamic visual displays have not been studied in this 
way. To test this hypothesis we designed an experiment in which the stimuli had the same 
distributional structure, but consisted of animated videos of actions.  
Study 2: Infant Learning 
Methods 
Participants 
Thirty-seven 10.5- to 12-month-old infants participated in the study. Participants were 
recruited through birth announcements in the local newspapers. Infants were randomly assigned 
to the unimodal or bimodal condition (Unimodal condition: n = 20, 6 female, 14 male, age range 
332 – 374 days, mean =  347; Bimodal condition: n = 17, 9 female, 8 male, age range 322 – 366 
days, mean = 347). Infants received an infant t-shirt or bib as a gift for participation. 
Stimuli 
Each participant viewed a corpus of animations of a bug moving across the screen. There 
were also three gray boxes on the screen; one at the lower left, one in the center, and one at the 
upper right. In each familiarization animation, the bug either emerged from the lower-left box 
and disappeared behind the center box, or emerged from the center box and disappeared behind 
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the upper right box. The path of the bug was identical except that it occurred with equal 
frequency on opposite sides of the screen.  
The manner of the bug’s motion differed along a continuum between actions. At one 
extreme, the bug was repeatedly compressed longitudinally and did not rotate. At the other 
extreme, the bug rotated in alternating directions through 90 degrees and was not compressed 
longitudinally. Fifteen intermediate stimuli were constructed using linear steps of rotation angle 
and linear steps of compression, such that as one type of motion increased, the other decreased 
(Fig. 7). Thus, the actions differed from each other by objectively equal steps, but were designed 
not to differ in salience. 
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Figure 7: Example stimuli. Pictured are still frame sequences of animations 1, 5, 11, and 
15, where 1 and 15 are the extremes. 
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Familiarization animations consisted of one of these 15 manners, and could have either of 
the two paths. In the test animations, the bug emerged from the lower-left box, passed behind the 
center box, and finally disappeared behind the upper right box (Fig. 8). The manner during the 
second half of the path was either the same as the first half or different. The manners used were 
steps 4 and 12 of the continuum, because these were seen an equal number of times by 
participants in both conditions. Thus the test trials came in four forms: 4-4 (same), 12-12 (same), 
4-12 (different), and 12-4 (different). 
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Figure 8: Screen shots from a test trial. The motion before and after the midpoint could either 
maintain the same manner (Same) or change in manner (Different). 
Procedure 
All participants were tested by the author. During the familiarization phase, each infant 
saw a total of 47 animations. Each infant saw each animation, but the number of times each 
animation was seen differed between conditions. The distributions used contained the same 
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unimodal/bimodal structure as those in the simulation and Maye et al. (2002), but were modified 
to include a finer continuum with 15 steps instead of 8 (Fig. 9). They contained 47 total trials 
instead of 64 to limit the duration of the experiment and prevent fussiness; simulations with this 
distribution produced all the same results. Each familiarization animation lasted 4 seconds. The 
order of familiarization trials was random. The side of the screen in which the motion occurred 
(lower-left or upper-right) was counterbalanced so that each participant saw an equal number of 
stimuli on the two sides of the screen, and each participant saw manners 4 and 12, which were 
used in the test trials, same number of times on each side of the screen. Between familiarization 
and test, infants saw an animation of the bug traversing the same path as in the test trials, but 
without rotation or compression. This ensured that infants were still attending to the test trials 
and also pre-exposed infants to the full-screen path that was used during the test trials to reduce 
its novelty. Then, infants saw two blocks of 4 test trials (two Same, two Different), lasting 8 
seconds each. The order of test trials was random within each block.  
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Figure 9: Bimodal vs. Unimodal distributions of stimuli used for familiarization. The 
distribution for the Bimodal group is shown by the dashed line, and the Unimodal group by the 
solid line. 
Infants watched the familiarization and test phases seated in the caregiver’s lap, facing 
the screen onto which the stimuli were projected. A camera mounted on the wall faced the infant 
so that the experimenter in an adjacent room could monitor looking. Caregivers wore a baseball 
cap with a veil attached so they could see their infants but not the screen.  
Each infant saw the same number of trials, with the exception that if the infant did not 
look at the trial for at least 1 second, the trial was repeated. An attention getting stimulus played 
between trials, and the next trial started when the infant looked at the screen while the attention 
getter was playing.  
Looks and looks away were coded if they lasted at least 0.5 seconds. Total looking time 
and number of looks away were recorded for each familiarization trial and test trial. For test 
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trials, we were especially interested in whether infants tended to look differently at the second 
half of Same versus Different trials. We hypothesized that infants who discriminated between 
different motions would perceive the change in motion that occurred in Different trials as a 
salient event, and would therefore show different amounts of looking to the second half of Same 
versus Different trials, immediately after the change or non-change. We predicted that only 
infants in the Bimodal condition would look more at Different trials. 
Results 
Look-away rate 
The experiment was divided into five periods: familiarization trials 1-12, trials 13-24, 
trials 25-36, trials 37-47, and the test phase. For each participant the look-away rate was 
computed for each period as the number of looks away divided by total looking time (Fig. 10). 
An ANOVA with period as within-subjects factor and condition as between-subjects factor 
revealed a main effect of period, F (4, 35) = 13.27, p = 0.001. Post-hoc tests revealed that the 
look-away rate increased from trials 1-12 to trials 13-24, t(36) = 4.47, p < .001, and from trials 
13-24 to trials 25-36, t(36) = 2.54, p = .015, but not from trials 25-36 to trials 37-47, t(36) = 
1.646, p = .11. Look-away rate decreased from trials 37-47 to Test, t(36) = –3.61 , p = .001. 
There was no significant main effect of condition, F(1, 35) = 1.32, p = .26,  and no significant 
period x condition interaction, F(4, 35) = 0.43, p = .0.79.  
	   31	  
 
Figure 10: Mean look-away rates (±1 SE) over the course of familiarization and test 
phases. Look-away rates increased from trials 1-12 to 13-24 and from 13-24 to 25-36 in the 
familiarization phase, and decreased from the end of the familiarization phase to the test phase, 
showing a pattern of habituation and dishabituation. 
 
 
 
Test phase 
 Look-away rates were recorded for the second half of each test trial. For each condition, 
the look-away rates were compared between Same and Different test trials. In addition, trials 
were separated by order, which ranged from 1 to 4, i.e. the first to fourth trial of that type seen by 
that participant (Fig.11). Because the look-away rate for a single trial was non-normally 
Unimodal
Bimodal
*
*
*
Lo
ok
s 
aw
ay
 p
er
 s
ec
on
d
0
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
Phase
Famil. 1-12 Famil. 13-24 Famil. 25-36 Famil. 37-47 Test
	   32	  
distributed, means were compared using Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. A pair of Same and 
Different points were considered matched if they came from the same participant and had the 
same order. Look-away rate did not significantly differ between Same or Different trials in the 
Bimodal condition (p = .853) or in the Unimodal condition (p = .438). No significant differences 
were found by comparing only trials of a specific order (ps > .2). 
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Figure 11: Mean look-away rate (±1 SE) for Same vs. Different test trials by condition. 
A: Unimodal condition. B: Bimodal condition 
Discussion 
Over the course of the familiarization phase, look-away rate increased in both conditions 
due to habituation, then decreased again during the test phase as infants dishabituated to the 
changes in the stimulus. There was a tendency for infants in the Bimodal condition to look away 
less frequently than infants in the Unimodal condition, which increased over the course of the 
experiment, though the effect was not statistically significant. It would be interesting to increase 
the sample size to determine whether conditions would differ with higher statistical power. If so, 
this would indicate that infants attend to the learnable category structure, as their attentiveness is 
not different at the start of familiarization but diverges as they gain more familiarity with the 
distributional properties of the stimulus. 
Variability in rate of looking away during test trials was too high to determine whether 
infants in the different conditions perceived the animations differently. We did not observe 
evidence that infants in any condition differentiated Same test trials from Different test trials. 
A potential future study would test older infants to investigate whether distributional 
information facilitates verb learning. I would familiarize infants with a unimodal or bimodal 
distribution of actions, then test whether distributions affect their ability to subsequently learn 
verbs referring to these actions. 
Another potential direction is to test adults’ categorical learning of the same stimuli. This 
would allow more detailed response measures than looking time, and may allow characterization 
of perceptual differences more subtle than same/different judgments. I will expose adults to the 
same stimuli used here, then test their perception of the similarity between different pairs of 
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animations from the set. There is evidence that adults can learn categorical perception by 
distributional learning [14]. Additionally, the DFT model predicts that the effect of distributional 
learning should increase with a delay between presentation of the two stimuli, as internal 
representations drift. Therefore, I will test adults’ similarity judgments with and without this 
delay. If significant learning effects are observed in this study, then it will be useful to find a 
more sensitive measure for learning in infants. Maye et al. [9] used looking time to infer 
distributional learning in 8-month-old infants. Their test trials differed from ours in that they 
contrasted Alternating test trials, in which two different stimuli were alternately played, with 
Non-Alternating trials, in which the same stimulus was repeatedly played. In contrast, our 
Different and Same test trials each consisted of a single stimulus pair. This was done to limit the 
duration of the test phase, but could obscure effects if differences in looking emerge on a slow 
timescale, such that total looking over a series of Alternating and Non-Alternating stimuli may 
differ while look-away rates immediately after changes to the stimulus may not. 
Alternatively, it may be necessary to use additional, more interactive or fine-grained 
methods of measuring infant looking behaviors [25]. Gaze tracking would allow measurement of 
looks to and looks away from more precise regions of interest. 6-to-8-month infants can also 
rapidly learn to look at on-screen “buttons” to produce a contingent response [26]. This type of 
paradigm could be used to directly test infants’ ability to discriminate different motions using a 
gaze-contingent reward for correct responses. Another related approach is to have different 
motions predict the appearance of a rewarding visual stimulus and use predictive looking, or 
looks to the location of the reward before it appears, as a learning measure [27].  
Taken together, this program of research will have significant implications for 
understanding how infants learn to interpret the world. A statistical learning approach to the 
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study of language acquisition has revolutionized our understanding of the mechanisms 
underlying language development. [3, 4, 9]. A similar approach to social development can have a 
similar effect on how infants learn to interpret others’ social behavior. Additionally, this 
knowledge can inform language and social interventions in young children, as well as artificial 
intelligences that learn to identify and categorize relevant items in a complex input. While 
clustering algorithms exist to solve categorization problems, it is not known how corresponding 
processes are implemented in the brain, or how they are linked to other cognitive computations.  
In addition, further research into this and related questions will help elucidate how 
learning mechanisms and structural regularities in social behavior coevolve. This idea has been 
well elaborated in the case of the structure of language coevolving with the capacities of the 
human brain [28], but, just as the statistical learning processes that support language acquisition, 
it is likely to be far more general. For example, the regularities present in people’s non-linguistic 
gestures and other social actions may be influenced by infants’ ability to perceive, attend to, and 
learn that structure. Comparative studies could investigate how distributional or sequential 
structure in social actions in different species of birds, rodents or nonhuman primates relates to 
the learning abilities of those species.  
Appendix 
Model Equations 
The neural field dynamics used here wore originally introduced by Amari [16]. For a 
developmental application of a similar model, see [29]. 
Activity in PF changes according to Equation 1: 
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  !! !, ! =   −! !, !   + ℎ! + ! !, ! + !" !, ! + !!! ! − !! ! ! !! !!! −    !!" ! −!! ! ! !! !!!         (1) 
 ! !, !   represents the activity of neuron x at time t. ! defines the time course of the field’s 
dynamics. The −! !, !  and ℎ!terms together cause the field’s activity to decay to resting level ℎ!. ! !, !  represents the input to neuron x and time t. This is determined as described below 
from the activity of the other fields and, for PF, the stimulus. !" !, !  is Gaussian distributed 
noise, !!! ! − !! ! ! !! !!! represents the cooperative interactions among locations in the 
field, and − !!" ! − !! ! ! !! !!!represents inhibition from IF. The interaction kernel, ! ! − !! , specifies the magnitude of interaction between two neurons, ! and !!, and takes the 
form of a Gaussian with mean 0 so that nearby sites interact cooperatively (Equation 2).  ! is a 
sigmoid soft threshold function applied so that only neurons with significant activity influence 
other neurons (Equation 3). Integration over all values of !′ provides for input from all active 
sites. Finally, S(x,t) is the input to neuron x at time t from the stimulus. 
The interaction kernel ! consists of a scaled Gaussian: 
 ! ! − !! =   !    !"# − !!!! !!!!         (2) 
 
The sigmoid function is given by: 
 ! ! =    !!!!"# !!"          (3) 
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The input is given by 
 !(!, !) =   !    !"# − !!!!"#$!" !!!!         (4) 
for timesteps in which a stimulus is present, where !!"#$"% varied from 58 to 114 in steps of 8, 
and !(!, !) = 0 when no stimulus is present. Each trial lasted 225 timesteps and the stimulus was 
present for steps 20 – 220. 
 
Activity in IF is computed according to Equation 5: 
 !! !, ! =−! !, !   + ℎ! + !" !, ! + !!" ! − !! ! ! !! !!! −    !!" ! − !! ! ! !! !!!   
            (5) 
 
IF receives input from both PF and WM, but not from other sites in IF. 
Activity in WM is computed according to Equation 6: 
 !! !, ! =−! !, !   + ℎ + !" !, ! + !!" ! − !! ! ! !! !!! −    !!" ! − !! ! ! !! !!! +!!" ! − !! ! ! !! !!!  + !!_!"# ! − !! ! !!"# !! !!!      
           (6)   
WM receives excitatory input from itself, from PF, and from LTM-WM, and inhibitory input 
from IF.   
Activity in LTM-WM is computed according to Equation 7: 
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!!"# (x, t) = !  !!"# !,! !! ! !,!!!"#$% !! !,! !! + !!!"# !,!!!"#$% 1− !! !,! !!     (7) 
where !! !,! !! = 1 if ! !, ! > 0, and 0 otherwise. Thus whenever a neuron in WM has positive 
activity, its output is added to LTM-WM. LTM-WM has two time constants !!"#$% and !!"#$%, 
used for neurons that receive input on that timestep or receive no input, respectively. 
Model Parameters 
Time constants: 
 !! = 20, !! = 20, !! = 20, !!"#$% = 1000, !!"#$% = 5000 
Resting levels: ℎ! =   ℎ! = ℎ! = −5 
Slope of sigmoid function: ! = 5 
Interaction kernels: !!! = 25  ,!!! = 5 !!" = 20  ,!!" = 10 !!" = 10  ,!!" = 5 !!" = 20  ,!!" = 5 !!" = 20  ,!!" = 10 !!! = 25  ,!!! = 5 !!_!"# = 4,!!_!"# = 2 
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